In this paper we analyze the political viability of equalization rules in the context of a decentralized country. In concrete terms, we suggest that when equalization devices are perceived as unfair by one or more regions, political conflict may emerge as a result. Political conflict is analysed through a non cooperative game. Regions are formed by identical individuals who, through lobbying, try to impose their regional preferences on the rest of the country, and political conflict is measured as the total contribution to lobbying. We conclude that the onset of conflict depends on the degree of publicness of the regional budget. When regional budgets are used to provide pure public goods, proportional equalization is politically feasible. However, no equalization rule is immune to conflict when budgets are used to provide private goods or a linear combination of private and public goods.
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Introduction
Fiscal equalization is a redistribution device which serves to correct vertical …scal unbalances and to diminish horizontal inequity 1 between regions. It also works as an insurance (risk sharing) 2 mechanism in decentralized countries. The level of …scal equalization determines the degree of solidarity between regional governments. In this sense, an excessive level of redistribution would be perceived as unfair, by the contributing regions, if they end up losing positions in the …nal (resource) ranking. In fact, the literature on income distribution considers the reranking e¤ect due to progressive transfers as undesirable. Moreover, the Principle of Transfers, also known as the Pigou-Dalton condition (Sen, 1973) , establishes that any small transfer from a relatively richer individual to a relatively poorer individual which does not alter the order (ranking) in the income distribution is inequality reducing. Notice, though, that the preservation of the original ranking is a necessary condition. 3 Therefore, it seems quite reasonable that the same Principle of Transfers should also be applied when redistributing resources between regional governments in order to secure horizontal equity (as de…ned in note 1). Furthermore, it is in the general interest that the equalization device should be the result of the consensus of all the parts involved since a situation perceived as unfair by any of them could lead to political con ‡ict and instability. 4 The objective of this paper is to analyse the political viability of equalization rules using a model of con ‡ict in the spirit of Ray (2009) , which o¤ers a generalization of the particular case of con ‡ict games developed in Esteban and Ray (1999) and explored in detail by Esteban and Ray (2008) . Thus, we analyze the circumstances under which one region would be inclined to initiate political con ‡ict when equalization rules are perceived as unfair. Political con ‡ict is analysed through a game where two regions seek to maximize their payo¤s in a Nash framework. The population of each region is considered a group of players with identical preferences. Thus, each region is a lobby group whose residents make some contribution (e¤ort) to lobbying to try to impose their regional preferences for equalization on the rest of the country. Political con ‡ict is de…ned as the total amount of resources expended on lobbying.
In order to apply the standard model of con ‡ict, we assume that there exists a vertical grant (S); coming from the Central Government (CG), which is to be distributed between two regions indexed by 1 and 2. The distribution of the grant S is organized in two phases. In the …rst phase, the CG distributes a 1 According to the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982, Section 36 (2); the purpose of equalization is to ensure "that provincial governments have su¢ cient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation". This is the de…nition of horizontal equity between subcentral government units (e.g., provinces, regions, municipalities, etc.). 2 See, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (1996) . 3 See, Lambert (2001) for more on this.
transfer of H < S in order to achieve full equalization of per capita standard revenues. 5 In the second phase, the CG distributes Q = S H. We assume that the criterion to distribute Q is not …xed but is the result of a social agreement. Thus, regions have di¤erent preferences regarding their favoured option. Consequently, each region behaves as a lobby group, defending its best choice in its negotiations with the CG.
We assume, as is customary in models of con ‡ict, that each region obtains zero utility (bene…t) when its best alternative is not chosen. We thus consider three di¤erent distribution principles for sharing Q between regions 1 and 2. In the …rst, we assume that every region receives a proportion of Q equal to its population share, n i : This implies that full equalization of standard per capita revenues is …nally achieved. In the second principle, we deem that Q goes in full to the less deserving 6 region. Thus, after equalization, disparities between regions diminish but are not fully cancelled out. This means that the ranking of regions, in terms of standard per capita revenues, is kept constant after equalization. This kind of equalization scheme is used in many countries: two well documented examples are the systems in place in Canada and in the German Länder (see, Boadway and Shand (2007) , Werner (2008) ).
Finally, under the third principle of distribution, we consider that Q goes in full to the more deserving region. The result then, is an over-redistribution in favour of the more deserving one which causes a reranking of regions. Thus, after equalization, the more deserving region has more per capita revenues than the initially less deserving region and, consequently, it is able to provide a higher level of public goods and services. The situation derived from the third distribution principle …ts the Spanish case perfectly. 7 It is worth noting that the reranking e¤ect characteristic of the Spanish equalization system is quite an exceptional case, although not unique: 8 up to 2000 the German Länder were living a situation in which excessive redistribution was also causing a reranking e¤ect. 9 5 We use the term, standard revenues, to refer to those revenues obtained by regional governments when exerting a standard …scal e¤ort. The use of a standard …scal e¤ort is a common feature of equalization grants since it reduces the strategic decisions by regional governments. Usually, the standard …scal e¤ort is exogenously determined by the central government, or is calculated as the average tax rate. For instance, in the Canadian equalization system the average tax rate of the thirteen provinces is used as indicator of standard …scal e¤ort. 6 We consider than one region is more deserving than the other. By this we mean than one region (the more deserving ) needs a higher grant to provide the same level of public services than the less deserving region making a similar standard …scal e¤ort. One region might be more deserving because its tax base is smaller but also because it has larger needs (larger population, older population, more poverty, etc.) when providing public services. 7 In Spain the equalization device between regional governments has always been characterized by progressive transfers that cause a reranking e¤ect. This (long-lasting) situation has lead to the discontent of the relatively richer regions and, especially of Catalonia, which has been the leader of the decentralization process. Finally, the Catalan government has demanded a full revision of the …nancing system (including the equalization scheme) in the framework of the new Catalan Constitutional Law (2006). 8 See, Boadway and Shah (2007) , Shah (2007) . 9 The equalization law (Finanzausgleichsgesetz, 1993) was impugned before the Federal
In the theoretical model, we assume that the solution under the peaceful agreement is full equalization between regions, in other words, proportional sharing of Q. Thus, we analyse the conditions under which regions would be inclined to instigate political con ‡ict in a non cooperative frame. The timing of the game is as follows. In the …rst stage, individuals decide the resources they will expend on regional lobbying. The total amount of resources spent in each region determines the region's probability of imposing its preferences on the rest of the country. Accordingly, each region decides whether to toe the line or whether to show disagreement. If either region disagrees, each side receives "con ‡ict payo¤s". Otherwise, they receive "peace payo¤s". We obtain that the emergence of political con ‡ict depends on the degree of publicness of the regional budget. When regional budgets are used to provide pure public goods, proportional equalization is politically viable. However, no equalization rule is immune to political con ‡ict when budgets are used to provide private goods, or a linear combination of public and private goods, which is a more realistic scenario.
Our analysis relates to three strands of the literature: social con ‡ict (Esteban and Ray, 1999 Ray, , 2008 Ray, , 2009 Esteban and Schneider, 2008) , the viability of political systems and social decision rules (Esteban and Ray, 2001a , 2001b , 2008 , and rent-seeking and lobbying (Verdier and Ades, 1996; Mohtadi and Roe, 1998; Rama and Tabellini, 1998; Esteban and Ray, 2006).
The paper is organized in four sections. Following this introduction, a standard model of con ‡ict is presented. Section 3 is focused on analyzing the immunity to con ‡ict of di¤erent equalization rules. Finally, section 4 concludes o¤ering some re ‡ections about the political implications of the results obtained.
A model of political con ‡ict
Let's assume that the CG is due to implement a vertical equalization grant to secure horizontal equity between regional governments. Accordingly, the standard equalization grant is de…ned proportional to regional needs and inversely related to standard regional revenues. One of the main issues in setting grants of this kind is to decide whether equalization should be total or partial. If equalization is fully accomplished, then regional governments achieve standard average revenues per unit of need and disparities are fully cancelled. In contrast, if equalization is partial, grants are used to diminish disparities ensuring that all regions manage to cover a certain level of public provision 10 while leaving relatively less deserving regions still better o¤ after the equalization takes place.
Constitutional Court (FCC) by the Länder of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and Hesse. As a result, the degree of equalization was reducedm, moving to a partial equalization scheme, and the reranking e¤ect was avoided. In other words, the reform signi…ed moving from the third to the second distribution principle mentioned above (Fenge and Weizsäcker, 2001) .
1 0 This level could be de…ned, for example, as some sort of corrected mean or as a percentage of the mean. The equalization system of the Canadian provinces (see, Boadway, 2007; Vaillancourt, 1998 ) o¤ers an example of the …rst possibility while the equalization system among German Länder (Werner, 2008) , is an example of the second.
Regional preferences about the level of equalization need not be homogeneous. In fact, relatively more deserving regions are likely to defend more egalitarian systems while relatively less deserving regions will probably be happier under partial equalization. Thus, it might be not straightforward to reach an agreement on the desired level of equalization. Also, if the equalization rule applied by the central government is not considered fair or good enough by one of the regions a situation of political con ‡ict could emerge.
To simplify let's consider two regions, labeled 1 and 2, which di¤er in their favored alternative for equalization, while they are indi¤erent to the preferences of the other region. Each region is composed by N i individuals with homogeneous preferences for equalization and linear utilities, with
population. Each region attempts to impose its own preferences for equalization on the rest of the country through lobbying. Thus, we measure political con ‡ict as the global amount of resources expended on lobbying.
Consider now that the vertical equalization grant o¤ered by the CG totals S euros and that regional population is used as the indicator of regional needs. 11 Moreover, let's assume that the CG distributes the amount S between region 1 and 2 in two steps in the following way. First, the CG distributes H euros to fully equalize standard per capita revenues. And second, the CG distributes the rest of the grant, Q = S H; between the two regions. There are three possible rules for distributing the extra amount Q:
(a) Proportional share: each region receives a total amount equal to n i Q, where n i is the proportion of population in region i. After distributing the total grant, S; standard per capita revenues are fully equalized between regions.
(b) Q goes in full to region 1. In this way, the result is partial equalization and the relatively less deserving region continues to be better o¤ after equalization. In other words, the equalization system respects the original regional ranking; regional disparities are reduced but not fully cancelled.
(c) Q goes in full to region 2. Consequently, there is over-redistribution and reranking of regions. In other words, after equalization, the originally more deserving region has higher per capita resources for providing public services than the originally less deserving region.
Let's use the proportional rule of distribution (a) as a benchmark. In other words, assume that the peaceful outcome is the result of applying the proportional rule. Then the other two rules of distribution, (b) and (c); could be conceived of as the outcomes of a lottery where the prize is Q. With probability p option (b) is implemented and region 1 obtains the prize Q: With probability (1 p) option (c) is implemented and it is region 2 that obtains the prize Q.
The winning probability of each region depends on its lobbying e¤ort, i.e., on the resources invested in lobbying. Thus, the probability of winning for region i is de…ned as,
where n i is the proportion of population in region i and r i are the resources devoted to lobbying by each individual residing in region i, i = 1 and 2. Social con ‡ict is de…ned as the total amount of resources spent on lobbying,
n j r j . The cost of lobbying 13 for each individual is expressed by the isoelastic function
Where c 0 (r i ) > 0 and c 00 (r i ) > 0 and is the cost elasticity. Because the cost function is strictly convex every individual will expend equal e¤ort (contribution) on lobbying. Furthermore, we will assume that there is no free-riding. 14 Formally, once a region has initiated con ‡ict, the objective of its political leader is to maximize the regional per capita payo¤ as follows
where p i i is the expected bene…t of region i when its …rst option is imposed on the rest of the country, and c(r i ) is the per capita cost of lobbying de…ned in (2).
The F.O.C corresponding to regions 1 and 2 are de…ned respectively by expressions (4)and (5) as follows
1 2 Skaperdas (1996) 1 3 We could think of it as the monetary and time resources expended on lobbying. 1 4 To take into account within group free-riding, we should introduce in the model the notion of e¤ ective relative size of the group allowing for rescaling. See Esteban and Ray (2001 a) for an analysis of the free-rider problem in rent-seeking models. Dividing (4) by (5) and rearranging terms, we obtain the relative e¢ cacy of lobbying by region 1 as
To fully de…ne the con ‡ict equilibrium solution we need to …nd the associated regional payo¤s. Then, taking for example region 1, from expression (4) we de…ne,
Now using (7) we can express the per capita payo¤ of region 1 as
Taking into account that p 2 = (1 p 1 ) and rewriting (8) we obtain
where k 2 (0; 1) since k = 1 ; (1 k) = 1 and > 1. Finally, combining equations (1) and (6) we can express the winning probability of region 1 as,
Thus equations (6) ; (9) and (10) de…ne the equilibrium solution under con‡ict corresponding to region 1. The equilibrium condition for region 2 is de…ned in a similar fashion.
Equalization rules immune to con ‡ict
Regions will initiate con ‡ict when in doing so they expect to obtain a pro…t with respect to the peaceful agreement. Considering that under peace every region receives q = Q N per inhabitant, region i would initiate con ‡ict if and only if
Condition (11) depends on the nature of i . We consider the extreme cases of private and public regional budgets and the general case where regional budgets are used to provide a mixture of pure public and private goods. In concrete terms, we analyse the following scenarios:
Private regional budgets. By this we mean that regional budgets are spent on providing rival public goods; in the extreme case we might think of monetary transfers. Since public goods are rival, the utility derived from them depends on population size.
Public regional budgets. By this we mean that there is no congestion or rivalry in the provision of public goods and therefore the derived utility is independent of population size.
Private and public regional budgets. This is the general case, where some of the goods provided by regional governments are pure public goods and others are rival public goods.
Private regional budgets
When regional budgets are used to provide private goods or rival public goods, the per capita payo¤ of imposing regional preferences is de…ned by i = q ni ; q = Q N and i = 1; 2: Thus, using (9) and (11) the condition for region i initiating con ‡ict is
where
and k 2 (0; 1) since k = 1 , (1 k) = 1 and > 1.
more populated regions have a higher probability of winning.
Proposition 1 Assume that regional budgets are used to provide private goods (and rival public goods), and that under the peaceful agreement, regions have a per capita equal share of Q. Thus, there exists a certain n i 2 0; 1 2 such that regions with a population share n i n will be likely to instigate political con ‡ict
To prove this proposition see that, simplifying, condition (12) reduces to kp i + (1 k) p The particular value n i depends on k: For example, for the particular case of = 2; n i = 1 4 and for = 6; n i is nearly zero. In fact, the intersection point n i decreases with k converging to zero as k increases. See that
To show that there is an unique intersection point, check that
The proof is now complete.
Notice that the critical value n i depends also on : Thus, caeteris paribus, n i decreases as increases, and the probability of political con ‡ict also falls. . Any region will be willing to initiate political con ‡ict if the payo¤ of doing so is higher than the payo¤ under peace. This corresponds to positive values of C in …gure 1. Thus, …gure 1 shows that only small regions will be likely to initiate political con ‡ict. Moreover, the intersection point with the x-axis (n i ) decreases as increases, tending rapidly to zero.
In this section we have argued that when regional budgets are used to provide private and rival public goods (in the extreme case, monetary transfers), small regions are more inclined to initiate political con ‡ict, if we de…ne the peaceful agreement as the proportional equalization rule. However, other possible peaceful agreements could be considered since regional governments are able to bargain for di¤erent equalization rules using compensating transfers (to the losers). Regional cooperation is feasible since the sum of the expected payo¤s under political con ‡ict is lower than the payo¤ received under peace 
Public regional budgets
Let us suppose that regional budgets are used exclusively to provide pure public goods. To simplify, consider that to produce one unit of any public good one unit of the budget is required. We de…ne the per capita utility derived from the public good as : Thus, the per capita payo¤ of imposing regional preferences is de…ned as i = : The payo¤ corresponding to the peaceful agreement (proportional rule) is de…ned as n i 15 .Thus, using (9) and (11) and simplifying, the condition for region i initiating con ‡ict is,
Proposition 2 Assume that regional budgets are used to provide pure public goods, and that under the peaceful agreement, regions have a per capita equal share of Q. Thus, no region will have an incentive to initiate political con ‡ict. Therefore, the proportional rule would be immune to political con ‡ict.
To prove this proposition, see that from (6) we know that r 1 = r 2 . Now, using (1) we can rewrite p i = sn i (i = 1; 2) where s = 1 we obtain that s = 1 and consequently that p i = n i : Finally, substituting p i 1 5 This de…nition implies that region i does not take into account the positive externalities derived from the provision of pure public goods in region j: This is equivalent to considering that the bene…ts obtained from pure public goods are regionally delimited.
by n i in (14) and simplifying, the equilibrium condition for con ‡ict (14) reduces to n i > 1 which is impossible since by de…nition n i 2 (0; 1) : This implies that con ‡ict will never occur and therefore the proportional rule is immune to political con ‡ict.
Private & public regional budgets
Let us consider now the general case where regional budgets are used to provide both rival and pure public goods. Thus, the per capita payo¤ of region i; when it imposes its own preferences, is de…ned as, i = h q ni + (1 ) i . Where 2 [0; 1] refers to the proportion of the budget assigned to provide rival public goods. Thus, (1 ) refers to the proportion of the budget attached to pure public goods provision or, in other words, the degree of publicness of the budget. Likewise, the payo¤ corresponding to the peaceful agreement (proportional rule) is de…ned as q + (1 ) n i . Thus, using (9) and (11) the condition for region i initiating con ‡ict is
To simplify let us assume = 2 and q = . Then (17) becomes
Taking partial derivatives we obtain that @pi @ni > 0: This implies, caeteris paribus, that more populated regions have higher probability of winning. However, @pi @ > 0 for n i 2 0; 1 2 and @pi @ < 0 for n i 2 1 2 ; 1 : Thus, the winning probability of small regions increases when the proportion of private goods in their budget also increases. In contrast, the winning probability of large regions increases when the proportion of pure public goods increases.
Proposition 3 Assume that regional budgets are used to provide a combination of private goods and pure public goods, and that under the peaceful agreement, regions have a per capita equal share of Q. Thus, for = 2 and q = , there exists a certain n 2 0; 1 2 such that regions with a population share n i n will be likely to launch into political con ‡ict
The proof of this proposition is as follows. First, see that condition (16) simpli…es to kp i + (1 k) p will not wish to engage in con ‡ict. Finally, we conclude that there must be a value n i 2 0; n i < 0 for n i < n i : Consequently, regions with n i < n i will have an incentive to initiate con ‡ict. For instance, setting = Condition (16) includes, as particular solutions, the extreme cases of pure private budgets and pure public budgets. Setting = 1 in (18) and substituting p i in (16) we obtain the equilibrium con ‡ict condition for the extreme case of only private goods when = 2. Thus,
Likewise, setting Setting = 0 in (18) and substituting p i in (16) we obtain the equilibrium con ‡ict condition for the extreme case of a budget devoted solely to provision of pure public goods when = 2. Thus,
As in the case of private regional budgets, regions can always agree on di¤er-ent peaceful equalization rules using suitable compensating transfers. In other words, regions could always bargain and reach a new agreement since the sum of the expected payo¤s under political con ‡ict is lower than the payo¤ received under peace
Conclusions
We have analysed the political viability of equalization rules using a standard model of con ‡ict, as in Ray (2009) . We have shown that the initiation of political con ‡ict depends on the degree of publicness of the regional budget. When regional budgets are used to provide pure public goods, proportional equalization is immune to political con ‡ict. This implies that full equalization would be politically feasible in this case. However, no equalization rule is immune to political con ‡ict when regional budgets are used to provide private goods or a linear combination of pure public goods and private goods. In both these settings there exists a population share n i < 1 2 such that a region with n i < n i would be inclined to spend resources on lobbying in order to impose its own preferences on the rest of the country. Consequently, neither partial equalization nor excessive redistribution would be immune to political con ‡ict.
From the analysis, it is clear that small regions are more likely to instigate political con ‡ict when budgets are private. This is because, in this case, they are more e¤ective relative to their size since per capita payo¤s from con ‡ict are higher the smaller the group. In contrast, when budgets are public, the size of the group does not matter and the e¤ectiveness advantage of being small disappears. This is why there is less risk of political con ‡ict when the publicness of regional budgets increases. Moreover, we have shown that peaceful agreements, other than full equalization are feasible through the de…nition of compensating transfers. 16 In this regard, we should further explore the use of political con ‡ict as a bargaining mechanism to establish new sharing rules as in Powell (2004) and Wagner (2000) .
Empirical evidence from Spain and Germany shows that equalization systems based on progressive transfers which cause the reranking of regions in terms of per capita (standard) revenues are not politically stable. Furthermore, the case of Germany is also an example of the use of transfers as an instrument to reach peaceful agreements other than full equalization. In concrete terms, after the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court (11 November 1999), the equalization device was reformed establishing a partial equalization system. Additionally, the eastern Länder were compensated and awarded high Federal investments until 2019, through the Solidarity Pact II.
Furthermore, the results obtained provide an intuitive argument for decentralizing the provision of public services. The argument would go as follows. When the degree of publicness of regional budgets is high, it is more e¢ cient to centralize the provision of public goods in order to take advantage of the economies of scale. However, when rivalry (congestion) is high, the risk of political con ‡ict increases in inverse proportion to regional size. Therefore, to reduce the cost of lobbying, the decentralization of pure public goods is recommended since they o¤er a lower risk of political con ‡ict. We have thus outlined two operating forces in opposite directions which would de…ne the optimal size of the jurisdiction in a similar fashion as in the generalized version of the Oates theorem of decentralization (1972) 17 . We should explore further this argument using a theoretical framework as in Desmet et al (2006) . Additional insights might emerge from the introduction of risk aversion in the maximization problem of regional political leaders. We could do this using the concept of political bias as in Jackson and Morelli (2006) . Thus, the probability of engaging in political con ‡ict would also depend on the private bene…t (or cost) that the political party in power would obtain from con ‡ict. Finally, we should explore the political viability of equalization rules taking into account the possibility that discontented regions threaten secession (see, e.g. 
